University of Miami Law Review
Volume 3

Number 4

Article 17

6-1-1949

Taxation -- Street Assessments -- Necessity That Abutting
Property Be Benefited

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Taxation -- Street Assessments -- Necessity That Abutting Property Be Benefited, 3 U. Miami L. Rev. 641
(1949)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol3/iss4/17

This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

CASES NOTED
any of these cases for making an exception to the rule and the exceptions are
apparently without foundation.
In the instant case the antinomy existing between the necessity for respecting individual rights and the unhindered execution of a governmental
tax program is recognized. The matter is, admittedly, not easily resolved, but
the court's disposition of the problem, by reinstating the bill of complaint in
the second action is clear and definite. Not so, however, with reference to the
issue of the counterclaim. Here, the court recognized the general rule disallowing counterclaims to tax suits but opines that it may have its exceptions:
that circumstances may give rise to new precedents; that the allegations of the
counterclaim, if proven, are sufficient to give the corporation relief; that in
their holding they do not mean to displace the general rule, but that a municipality cannot destroy one's property and at the samd time insist on payment
of taxes thereon. Alternatives in lieu of counterclaim, as in State Road Department v. Tharp,'0 are suggested, but none are directed. The significance
of the statement by the court that the allegations in the counterclaim and bill
of complaint are "not materially different" is left to conjecture. Accordingly,
it is difficult to perceive the precise point which tile court was attempting to
nmake with reference to counterclaims or set-offs in tax foreclosure actions.
The language creates more than an inference that the court is amenable
to exceptions to the counterclaim in tax foreclosures. It presents a possible
line of attack which, if successfully developed, threatens to cripple the enforcement of tax collections.

TAXATION-STREET ASSESSMENTS-NECESSITY
ABUTTING PROPERTY BE BENEFITED

THAT

The City of Miami Beach imposed assessments against abutting property
owners to pay for the paving of a street within the city. The property owners
filed a bill of complaint to invalidate the assessments, alleging. in substance,
that the improvements were of no benefit to the abutting land since this
particular section within the city was a quiet residential area, and that the
street improvement would decrease the value of the abutting land by making
the street a noisy, heavily-traveled thoroughfare. The lower court dismissed
the plaintiff's bill. Held, on appeal, decree reversed. Rajkin v. City of Miami
Beach, 38 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1949).
This decision will undoubtedly bring about a decrease in local strect
improvements in residential areas. It has been held in Florida that local
improvements result from a public demand for additional conveniences, and
10. 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941).
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the power to tax for them rests upon the existence of public necessity.'
Assessments for local improvements are definitely a part of the state's system
of taxation.2 The levying of an assessment is a legislative power which may
be delegated. 3 Therefore, Florida municipalities do not have inherent power
to levy special assessments and any such levy must be pursuant to delegated
legislative authority which must be substantially followed.4 Any material
departure by the municipality is fatal and the statutory authority is strictly
construed.5
Specifically, the state's municipalities do not have the power to adopt
different rules for apportioning the exp)ense of street improvenments from those
expressly designated by the legislature, and a failure to observe the particular
statute invalidates the assessment." Assessments for the cost of street improvements are justified, in Florida, only on the basis of special and positive
benefits accruing to the lands improved. 7 These benefits to the property must
be in addition to those received by the community at large,8 since Florida
is committed to the doctrine that special assessments cannot exceed the benefits
conferred on the property assessed."
The question as to whether property abutting upon a street is in fact
specially benefited by a street improvement does not rest exclusively in the
judgment of the municipal officers. 0 However, this determination is supposedly not a judicial function either." It is definite that the assessment
cannot be predicated on the cost of the improvement rather than on the particular benefits the property has received.' 2 In this determination of benefits
much depends on the property itself and the use to which it is put. Tile value
of abutting business property, at least, may be enhanced, through street
3
improvements, by permitting the passage of a greater number of persons.'
The ultimate test that Florida courts apply appears to be whether the property
assessed has been enhanced in value because of the improvement.' 4
After the exceptional benefits from the particular improvement have
been determined in relation to the property involved, it becomes the duty of
the local assessing body to make assessments according to the benefits each

I.-Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Lakeland, 94 Fla. 374, 115 So. 669 (1927).
2. Ibid.
3. Burnett v. Green, 97 Fla. 1007, 122 So. 570 (1929).
4. Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc., 119 Fla. 30, 160 So. 476 (1935).
5. Gainesville v. McCreary, 66 Fla. 507, 63 So. 914 (1913).
6. Carr v. Kissimmie, 80 Fla. 754, 86 So. 701 (1920).
7. Ft. Myers v. State, 95 Fla. 704, 117 So. 97 (1928).
8. Ibid.
9. Stockman v. Trenton, 132 Fla. 406, 181 So. 383 (1938).
10. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Lakeland, supra.
II. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Winterhaven, 114 Fla. XXV, 151 So. 321 (1933);
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Gainesville, 83 Fla. 275, 91 So. 118 (1922).
12. Ft. Myers v. State, supra.
13. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Lakeland, supra.
14. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Winterhaven, supra.
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parcel of property actually has received, 15 and any objection to an assessment
must be timely in order to be effective.16
Elsewhere, on the question of Local public improvements at the cost of
abutting owners, it has been established that it is not necessary to show
benefits in every possible respect to the property assessed; 17 nor must the
benefits be immediate and direct." However, some benefits from the improvements apparently have to be received within a reasonable time.' In determining the relation of the improvement to the property the present use to
which the property is devoted need not be controlling, 0 inasmuch as the value
2
of the potential use also may be considered. '
In the principal case there is no mention of the established presumption 22
that property abutting on a street which is improved receives behefits. It is
definite that the legislature may find that land in a city will generally be
benefited by having the streets paved,23 and the usual and normal effect of
street improvements has been found beneficial to the abutting land. 24 Ordinarily this should be true as to residential areas. 25 Although, in other jurisdictions abutting owners.have been denied the right to show lack of benefits, 26
in Florida it has been held that paving improvement allowing larger volumes
of traffic to pass may be of benefit to the public and not to the individual
27
property owners.
The main difficulty appears to be how much discretion the assessing
authorities shall be allowed to have in determining the benefits property
receives through the improvements. In some jurisdictions it has been held
that the assessing authority's determination as to whether property assessed
has received benefits is conclusive. 28 In other states the same result is reached
Under specific statutes. 29 Another view is that where the particular benefit
is more or less a matter of opinion, the determination of the assessing authorities is binding.30 In Florida this determination does not rest exclusively in

15. Ft. Myers v. State, supra.
16. Abell v. Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, 117 So. 507 (1928).
17. Kelly v. Chadwick, 187 U. S. 540 (1903).
18. Dickson v. Racine, 65 Wis. 306, 27 N. W. 58 (1886).
19. Ibid.
20. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chicago, 215 Del. 410, 74 N. E.449 (1905).
21. Appeal of Hunter, 71 Conn. 289, 41 Atd. 557 (1898).
22. St. Louis v. Hamley Realty Co., 329 Mo. 1172, 48 S. W.2d 938 (1932).
23. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 199 U. S. 430 (1905).
24. Posselius v. Detroit, 44 F.2d 395 (E.D. Mich. 1930).
25. Leggett v. Plainfield, 97 N. J. L. 341, 116 Atd. 490 (1922).
26. Shreveport v. Shreveport Traction Co., 134 La. 568, 64 So. 414 (1914).
27. Stockman v. Trenton, supra.
2?. Harton v. Avondale, 147 Ala. 458. 41 So. 934 (1906) ; Roberts v. Los Angeles,
7 Cal.2d 477, 61 P.2d 323 (1936) ; State v. District Court, -9 Minn. 62, 11 N. W. 133
(1882).
29. Beck v. Holland, 29 Mont. 234, 74 Pac. 410 (1903); St. Louis v. Excelsior
Brewing Co., 96 Mo. 677, 10 S.W. 477 (1889).
30. Long v. City of Monroe, 265 Mich. 425, 251 N. W. 582 (1933).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the judgment of the assessing authorities, but is apparently a question of fact
to be ascertained by the courts and established as any other fact. 1
Since Florida municipalities may assess the cost of local improvements
against abutting property, 2 Florida courts could be of some assistance by
interfering less in the assessing authority's determination as to when the
abutting property is benefited by the particular improvements involved. If the
assessing authorities' determination is reasonable, it should be final. While
assessment should be subject to judicial review, it is not a judicial function.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT-SECONDARY INJURY FUND
PROVISION
Claimant lost the sight of his right eye in an accident unconnected with
industry or his employment. Subsequently, while employed by the defendant,
he sustained an injury "arising out of and in the course of his employment"
which destroyed his other eye, rendering him completely blind. The deputy
commissioner found that under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act,' the claimant was permanently totally-disabled by the
latter injury alone, and imposed liability for total disability upon the defendant. The employer secured a reversal of the commissioner's determination
in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and this judgment
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On
certiorari held, that the employer is liable for the degree of disability which
would have resulted had there been no previous injury. The second-injury-fund
is liable for the balance necessary to equal compensation for total disability
even though the first injury did not occur within either industry or plaintiff's
emlployment.? Judgment affirmed. Lawson, Deputy Comrn'r v. Suwanee Fruit
& Steamship Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 503 (1949).
Determining the proper basis for computing compensation awards when
a previously-impaired-worker suffers a second injury, and as a result of the
combined injuries becomes permanently totally-disabled has been a troublesome prollii. 3 Not infrequently the courts adopt the view that the employee
31. Atlantic Coast line R. R. v. Lakeland, supra.
32. Prospere v. New Port Rickey, 98 FIa. 508, 124 So. 2 (1929).
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as anended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 (1946).
2. Id. k§ 908 (1) 11), 944 (In this chapter the second-injury-fund is referred to as
the special funid. This fund is filnanced by
1paymentts which every employer or his insurance
carrier is required to tmake for every injury causing the death of anl employee who left
no depenidents entitled to compensation. All finies and penalties collected under the
provisions of this act are also paid into this fund).

3. See Kossoris and Hammond, Work Performance of Physically Impaired Workers,

66 MONTIHY LABOR Ri~v. 31, 33 (Jan. 1948) ; U. S. BuiA:.wc OF L.A. STAT. BULL.. No.
564. 266 (1932); U. S. B-r.Au or LAH. STAT. BULL. No. 536, 249 (1931).

